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Abstract
In this study, we defined and quantified the degree of cognitive conflict induced by 
a discrepant event from a cognitive perspective. Based on the scheme developed, we 
investigated the relationship between cognitive conflict and conceptual change, and 
the influences of students’ cognitive characteristics on conflict in learning the con-
cept of density. Subjects were 171 seventh-grade girls from two city middle schools 
in Korea. Tests regarding logical thinking ability, field dependence/independence, 
and meaningful learning approach were administered. A preconception test and a 
test of responses to a discrepant event were also administered. Computer-assisted 
instruction was then provided to students as a conceptual change intervention. A 
conception test was administered as a posttest. In analyzing students’ responses to 
the discrepant event, seven types of responses were identified: Rejection, reinter-
pretation, exclusion, uncertainty, peripheral belief change, belief decrease, and be-
lief change. These types were then ordered into four levels. The results indicated 
that there existed a significant correlation between cognitive conflict and concep-
tual change. t-test results revealed that there were statistically significant differ-
ences in the degree of cognitive conflict by the levels of students’ logical thinking 
ability and field dependence/independence. Meaningful learning approach, how-
ever, was found to have no statistically significant effect on cognitive conflict. Edu-
cational implications are discussed. 
Keywords: cognitive conflict, discrepant event, science concept learning 
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Over the last twenty years, research on students’ conceptual under-
standing in science has been quite active. The importance of students’ 
preinstructional or alternative conceptions was a common theme run-
ning through this area of research (Scott, Asoko, & Driver, 1992), and 
numerous researchers continue to investigate students’ conceptions 
in various content domains (e.g., Borges & Gilbert, 1999; Roald & 
Mikalsen, 2000; Teixeira, 2000; Tytler, 2000; Voska & Heikkinen, 
2000). Previous research pointed out that many students’ precon-
ceptions, if not all, are often both pervasive and resistant to change 
through traditional expository forms of instruction, and simply in-
forming students of scientific conceptions is not enough. According to 
the alternative conception paradigm(e.g.,Driver, 1994), students’ pre-
conceptions are impervious to change because their preconceptions 
are not merely mistakes or false beliefs but instead, students possess 
their own cognitive support groups and defense mechanisms (Strike & 
Posner, 1992). Based on this viewpoint, several learning models were 
proposed (e.g., conceptual change model, generative learning model, 
etc.). Among them, the conceptual change model has been often ap-
plied to situations in which the target learning outcome is to change 
students’ misconceptions. 
The conceptual change model describes learning as the interaction 
that takes place between a student’s experience and his/her current 
conception. Therefore, many studies on conceptual change have fo-
cused on establishing conditions that promote situations where the 
student’s existing conception can be made explicit and then is di-
rectly challenged to create a state of conflict. As a result, many con-
ceptual change models incorporate specifically designed strategies 
called cognitive conflict approaches (Chan, Burtis, & Bereiter, 1997). 
Based on the theoretical model described by Posner, Strike, Hewson, 
and Gertzog (1982), this approach generally involves identifying a stu-
dent’s current state of knowledge and bringing about conflict so that 
he/she can replace the preconception with a scientifically accepted 
conception. 
The concept of cognitive conflict has its origin in Piaget’s theory of 
equilibration. The need to reduce conflict is a powerful human moti-
vation. Therefore, many Piagetian advocates believe that experienc-
ing conflict is indispensable to learning. The concept of cognitive con-
flict also has had much influence on science education researchers, 
K a n g  e t  a l .  i n  R e s e a r c h  i n  S c i e n c e  E d u c at i o n  3 4  ( 2 0 0 4 )       3
especially those who work in the area of concept learning. Some of 
these researchers regard cognitive conflict as a necessary condition 
for conceptual change in learning science concepts. Although the cog-
nitive conflict approach is one of the most frequently investigated 
strategies and consistently shows significant effects (Guzzetti, Snyder, 
Glass, & Gamas, 1993), some researchers have raised questions about 
the role of cognitive conflict. Zimmerman and Blom (1983) investi-
gated whether cognitive conflict is a precondition to acquire conser-
vation of weight. They were not able to find any evidence, however, 
supporting the necessity of cognitive conflict. They sarcastically con-
cluded that “Although there is extensive evidence that (cognitive) con-
flict has been a useful condition in the minds of theorists to explain 
learning, there is little evidence that (cognitive) conflict is widely ex-
perienced in the minds of learners.” (parentheses added by present 
authors). Other science education researchers (Dreyfus, Jungwirth, & 
Eliovitch, 1990; Linn, 1986; Tsai, 2000; Vosniadou, 1999) also pointed 
out that students are often unable to achieve meaningful conflict or to 
become dissatisfied with their preconceptions, even when confronted 
with conditions involving conflict. Moreover, even if the conflict is 
highlighted by some means, there is no guarantee that students will 
accept either its existence or its significance (Scott et al., 1992). 
Is it a merely false belief that cognitive conflict is a necessary con-
dition for conceptual change? Previous research that has investigated 
the effect of the cognitive conflict approach in science education, how-
ever, has consistently reported positive results. How can we accept 
these disparate views on cognitive conflict? One reason for this incon-
sistency might be that there are different interpretations of cognitive 
conflict. Science education researchers have examined the effects of 
cognitive conflict mainly on the bases of comparisons of group differ-
ences, and they tended to implement a combination of strategies and 
then evaluate their total impact (Guzzetti et al., 1993). In addition, 
cognitive conflict is often described briefly or not at all (Gorsky& Fi-
negold, 1994). As a result, it is not easy to grasp the explicit mean-
ing of cognitive conflict in science education research. Therefore, the 
definition of cognitive conflict should be more explicit and more spe-
cific in order to investigate the role of cognitive conflict in producing 
conceptual change. 
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Cognitive Conflict and Discrepant Event 
Berlyne (1970) described cognitive conflict as “a condition in which 
mutually interfering processes occur simultaneously and in which se-
lection of a motor response from a set of competing alternatives is 
therefore hampered” (p. 968). Unlike previous ones, his definition 
gave cognitive conflict a kind of generality such that the significance 
of cognitive conflict was seriously taken into consideration in a wide 
variety of learning situations (Cantor, 1983). The concept of cogni-
tive conflict was more specifically explained by Hewson (1988), and 
Stavy and Berkovitz (1980). They identified that there are two kinds 
of cognitive conflict related to the different forms of equilibration in 
Piaget’s theory; the conflict between a student’s conception and the 
experience, and the conflict between two different cognitive struc-
tures related to the same phenomenon. Of these two kinds of conflict, 
we will focus on the former because it is a key construct involved in 
phenomena known as discrepant events. Discrepant events have been 
one of the most important components in science education research 
based on the cognitive conflict approach, because dissatisfaction with 
an existing conception is central to the process of conceptual change 
and a discrepant event is the major source of initial dissatisfaction 
(Posner et al., 1982). 
Generally, a discrepant event is the physical experience that pro-
vides students with novel evidence to contradict their existing concep-
tions. The instructional use of a discrepant event assumes that it could 
induce cognitive conflict. When students encounter a discrepant event, 
it is expected that they should discover that their preconceptions are 
inadequate to explain the new experience, which might lead them to 
consider or invent alternative conceptions that can account for the dis-
crepant event. However, it has been reported that students in many 
cases do not necessarily arouse cognitive conflict through merely ex-
periencing a discrepant event (e.g., Chinn & Brewer, 1998; Gorsky & 
Finegold, 1994; Mason, 2001; Shepardson & Moje, 1999; Tirosh, Stavy, 
& Cohen, 1998). According to Murray (1983), even if the contradic-
tory event was presented to students, it may be (a) simply unnoticed, 
(b) tolerated or explained as paradox, mystery, or magic, (c) seen as 
an independent event, or (d) resolved prematurely or trivially by the 
discard of conflicting elements. 
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Perhaps, a simple falsification view of science has had too much in-
fluence on the research grouped under the cognitive conflict approach. 
At the same time, however, it is also unreasonable to simply underes-
timate or disregard the role of a discrepant event, because there have 
been only a few studies in which a separate corroborative measure of 
cognitive conflict was collected. Thus, the relationship between a dis-
crepant event and conceptual change needs to be more fully clarified. 
Zimmerman and Blom (1983) tried to operationalize cognitive con-
flict induced when preoperational first graders were presented with 
videotapes of varying degrees of conflict regarding conservation prob-
lems. They used two kinds of measures in quantifying cognitive con-
flict. First, based on Smedslund’s (1961) operational definition of cog-
nitive conflict, they chose students’ hesitation or latency in rendering 
judgments to items asked during an individual interview, as one indi-
cator of conflict. Their second index of conflict was the students’ self-
report, 3-point rating of feelings of uncertainty–certainty toward their 
responses to given items. More recently, Vandenplas-Holper (1996) 
measured cognitive conflict with 5 to 7-year-old children working on 
conservation tasks in triads. He used the sum of three markers as the 
degree of cognitive conflict: (a) spontaneous intra-individual conflict 
that occurs when the children disagree among themselves by using 
marked indicators of disagreement within the same time interval or 
within two adjacent intervals, (b) the number of experimenter’s state-
ments that stress intra- or inter-individual conflict, and (c) the num-
ber of children’s surprises with such interjections as “ah” or “oh.” In 
a study investigating students’ responses to specific information that 
contradicted their naive conceptions regarding evolution, Chan et al. 
(1997) measured students’ belief change by asking students to indi-
cate on an 11-point scale whether they agreed or disagreed with given 
statements. Two experts also evaluated each student’s response us-
ing the protocols of the interview. A criterion measure was then con-
structed to represent the average rating of the protocols. Correlations 
between students’ ratings and the criterion measures were computed 
and used as the degree of belief change. 
To sum up, investigators attempting to quantify cognitive conflict 
generally have measured either students’ overt behaviors or students’ 
ratings of given statements or problems. It seems apparent that stu-
dent’s overt behavior like hesitation, surprise, or talking to oneself 
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could be one of the hallmarks of cognitive conflict (Cantor, 1983). 
On the contrary, conflict could be only one of many possible reasons 
for those behaviors. Furthermore, the relationship between students’ 
overt behaviors (i.e., hesitation, etc.) and cognitive conflict is not so 
direct as to regard the scores obtained from the observation of stu-
dents’ behaviors as the degree of cognitive conflict. The style and/or 
intensity of behavior expressing his/her conflict must vary from stu-
dent to student so that we should never overlook the influence of the 
student’s personality on that relationship. The other index, the self-re-
port of belief, also should be seriously questioned. The problem here 
is that the score obtained from a self-report does not equal the degree 
of cognitive conflict induced but instead the degree of a student’s sub-
jective feeling about the given experience. Therefore, a more direct 
indicator that can detect psychological vacillations is needed in order 
to enhance the validity of measuring cognitive conflict. 
In this study, therefore, we sought to examine the relationship be-
tween cognitive conflict induced by a discrepant event and concep-
tual change. To this end, we devised a scheme for measuring cogni-
tive conflict from students’ responses to a discrepant event. Based on 
this scheme, then, we explore the relationship between cognitive con-
flict and conceptual change. 
We also investigate the influences of students’ cognitive character-
istics on the type of responses to discrepant events and the cognitive 
conflict it arouses. The success of using discrepant events in concep-
tual change learning probably depends on the willingness and ability 
of students to recognize the overt conflict. Thus, it could be assumed 
that students’ cognitive characteristics might be crucial factors when 
teachers use discrepant events to initiate cognitive conflict. Based on 
a synthesis of the research evidence cited in the relevant literature, 
we investigate the influences of three cognitive variables which de-
serve special attention: logical thinking ability, field dependence/in-
dependence, and learning approach. 
In order to reach a state of cognitive conflict, students need to de-
termine whether discrepant events are or are not valid and whether 
discrepant events are or are not congruent with their existing con-
ceptions (Chinn & Brewer, 1993). Thus, students who cannot effec-
tively use logical hypothetic-deductive reasoning (Lawson & Thomp-
son, 1988) might fail to exhibit cognitive conflict in response to a 
discrepant event. Field dependence/independence, which is related to 
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an individual’s cognitive style concerning how successfully he/she can 
disembed relevant information from a complex and potentially confus-
ing background (Witkin, Moore, Goodenough, & Cos, 1977), might be 
also a factor that influences cognitive conflict. Finally, students’ learn-
ing approaches might also influence cognitive conflict – whether stu-
dents accept the conflicting evidence and accommodate their existing 
conceptions or whether they use various coping tactics to avoid con-
flict. Because, as Donn (1989) reported, students classified as using a 
meaningful learning strategy tended to respond to novel problems by 
self-questioning and by relating and elaborating ideas, whereas their 
counterparts tended to respond by stating definitions and by failing 
to elaborate upon their ideas. 
Methods 
Target Misconception 
On choosing a concept to use in this study, several criteria were 
considered. First, we needed a concept that has been reported as dif-
ficult for students to learn through traditional expository instruc-
tion. Second, the concept should have been documented as one about 
which many students have a similar misconception. Third, the con-
cept should be intelligible to students. Finally, the concept should be 
one for which a discrepant event exists to confront the misconcep-
tion. The concept satisfying our criteria was density. Many research-
ers and educators have reported that density is a difficult concept to 
teach (e.g., Rieck, 1994; Shepherd & Renner, 1982), and traditional 
approaches to teaching density have had limited success at best at 
promoting a scientifically accepted conception (Hewson & Hewson, 
1983; Rowell & Dawson, 1977). One of the inherent difficulties with 
the concept of density, unfortunately, is that there is no direct way of 
measuring it. Some investigators have pointed out the complexity of 
the concept. That is, the concept of density is difficult because it re-
quires an understanding of ratio and proportion (Rowell & Dawson, 
1977) or because it is a compound variable dealing with two simul-
taneous variables, mass and volume (Adey & Shayer, 1988). The re-
sult that even older students had difficulties in understanding density 
(Hewson, 1986), however, means that there might be another factor 
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to consider. According to Smith, Snir, and Grosslight (1992), students 
generally have alternative conceptual frameworks for matter so that 
developing a concept of density should require a restructuring of their 
frameworks. 
An undifferentiated weight-density concept is one of the most pre-
vailing misconceptions among middle school students (Hewson & 
Hewson, 1983;Noh, Kang, Kim, Chae, & Noh, 1997; Rowell & Dawson, 
1977; Smith, Carey, & Wiser, 1985). Students fail to distinguish be-
tween weight and density. Instead, they unite components from both 
concepts in one undifferentiated weight-density concept (Smith et 
al., 1985) because mass, volume, and weight are correlated in every-
day life (Klopfer, Champagne, & Chaiklin, 1992). As a result, students 
usually use a poorly differentiated concept like “amount” instead of 
weight or density (Noh et al., 1997). Some researchers (e.g., Noh et al., 
1997; Smith et al., 1992), nonetheless, have demonstrated that appro-
priate conceptual change instruction can lead some 7th graders to un-
derstand the concept of density. Finally, a list of observable discrep-
ant events that contradict the misconception is also available. Since 
the undifferentiated weight density concept satisfied all our criteria, 
we chose it as the target misconception of this study. 
Participants 
This study was carried out with 350 grade 7 students (13 or 14 
years old) in Korea. According to the National Science Curriculum 
of Korea, the concept of density should be taught at grade 8. There-
fore, none of the students had been formally taught the density con-
cept. All participants were girls and were selected from two city mid-
dle schools. We needed schools that possessed a multimedia center 
equipped with enough personal computers (i.e., at least one computer 
for each student) in order to conduct our research. However, it is not 
so easy to arrange to use schools satisfying this condition because, in 
Korea, the average number of students per class is still about 35 so 
that most instruction using computers generally proceeds in pairs. 
Moreover, though many middle schools have been changed to reflect 
a coeducational status, there are still many boys’ and girls’ schools in 
Korea. Because of the difficulties for arranging schools and necessity 
of having students work independently on a personal computer, we 
were obliged to select two girls’ schools. 
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While conceptual change models have been widely advocated for 
helping students deal with misconceptions, little research has exam-
ined the relation between conceptual change and gender (Chambers & 
Andre, 1997). Though it has been often reported that there is a science 
achievement difference between boys and girls, a major review of gen-
der and science education indicated that the differences decrease to 
a trivial level among younger students (Kahle & Meece, 1994). Cham-
bers and Andre (1997) also reported that, when students’ interest 
level, experience, and prior knowledge had been controlled, there was 
no significant difference by gender in learning direct current concepts 
through the conceptual change approach. Thus, although the poten-
tial for a gender difference might exist, we did not perceive it to be a 
likely threat to the validity of our research results. 
Instruments 
Preconception test 
For the purposes of this study, there was a need to exclude students 
who did not exhibit the target misconception. We developed a precon-
ception test designed as a tool for choosing appropriate subjects and 
piloted it twice. In this test, students were asked to answer the ques-
tion – “When two balls of the same size were dropped into the wa-
ter, a small black ball weighing 100 g floated whereas a small gray 
ball weighing 500 g sank. Here is a 1,000 g large black ball made of 
same material as the small black ball. Does it sink or float when it is 
dropped into the water?” – and to explain reasons for their answers. 
Test of responses to a discrepant event 
A Test of Responses to a Discrepant Event (TRDE) was developed 
to examine the ways in which students respond to a discrepant event. 
This test was a modification of an instrument that Chinn and Brewer 
(1998) used. They used four different initial theories and six differ-
ent pieces of anomalous data to increase the diversity of students’ 
responses. Our purpose, however, was to investigate the influences 
of a given discrepant event on conceptual change in science instruc-
tion. Thus, we presented all students with only one initial theory and 
one discrepant event in the TRDE, because teachers generally present 
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their students with a single discrepant event with the intent to con-
tradict the most widely held misconception(s). The TRDE was also pi-
lot-tested twice in order to verify students’ comprehension of it. The 
TRDE consists of the following three parts: Initial explanation, dis-
crepant event, and students’ rating. Each part is elaborated upon in 
the next three paragraphs. 
Initial explanation: Students read a text in which a man suggest-
ing that the large black ball weighing 1,000 g must sink because it is 
much heavier than the gray ball which also sank. In order to support 
this explanation, some evidentiary examples were also presented here 
(e.g., “A piece of stone or iron sinks because it is heavy, but a block of 
wood or Styrofoam floats because it is light.”). We expected that stu-
dents who had the target misconception would enhance the credibility 
of their ideas after reading this text. As a check of initial belief, stu-
dents were asked to write whether they believed this initial explana-
tion or not, immediately after they had read it. 
Discrepant event: After reading the text which supported their ini-
tial beliefs, students read another text concerning a discrepant event 
which contradicted the initial explanation. An experimental result of 
a middle school student was described in the text. “Actually, a 100 g 
small plastic ball floated whereas a 500 g small iron ball sank in the 
water. However, a 1,000 g large plastic ball also floated contrary to 
the initial explanation.” To reduce students’ doubt about the reliabil-
ity of the experimental result, it was emphasized that other students 
in the class obtained the same results. In comparing their initial be-
liefs with the given discrepant event, we expected to evoke conflict in 
students holding the misconception. 
Students’ rating: In this part, students evaluated both the discrep-
ant event and the initial explanation. First, students rated the believ-
ability of the discrepant event (i.e., chose one from “I believe,” “I do 
not believe,” and “I do not know”) and produced reasons for their rat-
ings. Second, students rated the extent of consistency between the dis-
crepant event and the initial explanation (i.e., chose one from “con-
sistent,” “inconsistent,” and “I do not know”). They also gave written 
explanations for their ratings. Finally, students reported whether their 
belief had changed after having read the discrepant event, and ex-
plained their reasons. 
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Conception test 
We developed a conception test to examine whether the target mis-
conception changed to the scientific conception. Several test items 
were constructed on the basis of previous research concerning stu-
dents’ misconceptions about density (Adey & Shayer, 1988; Klopfer et 
al., 1992; Noh et al., 1997). Two rounds of pilot tests were conducted 
on 8th-grade Korean middle school students to eliminate or mod-
ify inappropriate items. The final version of the conception test con-
sisted of four items. All conception test items were written in a multi-
ple-choice format. Each item contained, in addition, an accompanying 
open–ended section to collect information about students’ rationales 
for their choices. The face validity of the test was verified by a panel of 
experts consisting of three science educators and three middle school 
teachers. The Cronbach’s internal consistency reliability coefficient for 
this test was .73. A 3-point scale was developed to rate the conception 
test. No and irrelevant responses were rated as a “0,” responses in-
dicating partial understanding (i.e., rationales were incomplete even 
though the correct option was chosen) were rated as a “1,” and re-
sponses showing sound understanding were rated as a “2.” Two raters 
independently scored a subset of randomly selected students’ answers. 
Each disagreement was discussed by the raters and then resolved. Af-
ter 90% interrater agreement was obtained, one rater scored all the 
answers and the other independently checked the scoring. 
Tests of cognitive variables 
Three tests were administered to measure students’ cognitive char-
acteristics in this study. All three tests were translated into Korean 
from English. The translation was verified by three science educators. 
Furthermore, we interviewed several students during pilot studies to 
verify whether students correctly understood the meanings of items. 
All of these students were, in science, of below average achievement 
level. Only a few minor problems were detected in responses from stu-
dents and the inappropriate wordings of items were revised with the 
help of middle school teachers. 
Students’ logical thinking ability was measured with the short-ver-
sion Group Assessment of Logical Thinking (GALT; Roadrangka, Yeany, 
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& Padilla, 1983) which includes 2 items each for the following 6 types 
of reasoning: Conservation, proportional reasoning, controlling vari-
ables, probabilistic reasoning, correlational reasoning, and combina-
tional reasoning. The total scores range from 0 to 12. The Cronbach’s 
internal consistency reliability coefficient for the sample used in this 
study was determined as .70. 
Field dependence/independence was assessed by the Find-A-Shape 
Puzzle (FASP; Linn & Kyllonen, 1981). This test measures students’ 
ability to disembed relevant information from an irrelevant back-
ground. Linn and Kyllonen showed that the FASP loads on the same 
factor as previously validated field dependence/independence instru-
ments. In this test, students must find simple figures concealed in five 
complex ones in a given time limit. One point is awarded for correctly 
locating each simple figure; the total scores range from 0 to 20. The 
internal consistency reliability coefficient was .89 for the scores ob-
tained in this study. 
Previous research revealed that students have predisposed learn-
ing orientations (Cavallo, 1996; Cavallo & Schafer, 1994; Entwistle 
& Ramsden, 1983). In order to identify their learning orientations, 
students were given a Meaningful Learning Approach Questionnaire 
(MLAQ) selected from the Revised Approaches to Studying Inventory 
(RASI; Entwistle & Tait, 1994) designed to assess students’ approaches 
to learning. The RASI consists of five subcategories: Deep approach, 
surface approach, strategic approach, lack of direction, and academic 
self-confidence orientations. Since item separability of the deep, sur-
face, and strategic approach subcategories had been validated (Duff, 
1997), we used 10 questions that addressed students’ deep (meaning-
ful) learning approaches in this study. The instrument asked students 
to respond to questions regarding how they learn, ranging from 1 (dis-
agree) to 5 (agree). An internal consistency reliability coefficient of 
.81 was obtained for this test. 
Procedure 
To investigate their cognitive characteristics, students were ad-
ministered the GALT, the FASP, and the MLAQ. Next, the preconcep-
tion test for identifying students in possession of the target miscon-
ception and the TRDE for examining their responses to a discrepant 
event were conducted. Finally, after completing all pretests, students 
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were exposed to 15 minutes of conceptual change intervention con-
cerning the concept of density. In order to control the influences of 
teacher and learning environment on students’ learning, we devel-
oped a computer program using the Macromedia Flash 5 that has ad-
vantages in creating animations and presentations. Computer assisted 
instruction (CAI) using this program was implemented as the inter-
vention. Students were assigned to work individually on the CAI pro-
gram to exclude the possibility that interpersonal interactions might 
influence their individual learning. 
The CAI program was devised to correspond to the concept intro-
duction and application stages of general conceptual change models. 
Through the CAI program, students were first presented with anima-
tion showing that weight cannot be a criterion for predicting whether 
a certain object would sink or float. The new concept, density which 
was defined as the mass per unit volume, was then introduced as an 
alternative criterion for predicting a “sink or float” problem. At the 
end of the CAI program, students were provided with some applica-
tion problems and received feedback when it was necessary. 
On designing the content of the CAI program, in addition, we de-
cided to concentrate on explaining the phenomenon, a “sink or float” 
problem, at a macroscopic level because the microscopic view of mat-
ter is not necessary to achieve an understanding of the distinction be-
tween weight and density. Scientists had also achieved a clear differ-
entiation between weight and density even before their acceptance 
of an atomic theory of matter in the history of science (Smith et al., 
1985).No attempt was made to teach students the distinction between 
weight and mass because the numeric value of the two quantities is 
proportional on the Earth and this distinction is not requirement for 
seventh graders to understand the core concept of density. Students 
completed the conception test the day after the instructional protocol. 
From an original pool of 350 students, we included 171 subjects in 
this study. First, 130 students were excluded because their answers to 
the preconception test indicated that they did not possess the target 
misconception. Another 27 students were eliminated because they did 
not agree with the initial explanation. Although these students also had 
chosen the wrong option in the preconception test as had the subjects, 
we regarded their disagreement with the given initial explanation as 
indicating a possibility that they had other misconceptions. Finally, 22 
students were ineligible because they did not complete all tests. 
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Cognitive Conflict Scoring Protocol 
Unlike previous research which focused on either students’ behav-
iors as expressions of conflict or students’ self-ratings, we wanted a 
more direct method of quantifying cognitive conflict. The extent of 
cognitive conflict induced by a discrepant event appears to be a func-
tion of the interaction between a student’s existing conception and 
his/her new experience. The greater the difficulty in reconciling an 
existing conception and a discrepant event, the greater the conflict. 
For example, if students were able to cope with a discrepant event by 
making relatively minor changes to their existing conceptions, then 
it would lead to a low state of cognitive conflict. Moreover, when they 
are working on the process of assimilation, a limited restructuring 
of an existing conception, students typically show certain responses 
like adjusting or distorting the experience to conform to their exist-
ing conceptions (Tsai, 2000). Therefore, responses to a discrepant 
event might be one of the indicators for quantifying cognitive conflict. 
It has been reported that students make a diverse range of re-
sponses to discrepant events (Chinn & Brewer, 1993, 1998; Gorsky& 
Finegold, 1994; Mason, 2001; Shepardson & Moje, 1999; Tirosh et al., 
1998). Gorsky and Finegold (1994) investigated students’ responses 
to an anomaly regarding “forces.” They asked nine high school stu-
dents to set up a force array showing the forces he/she claims are 
acting on an object and then presented each of them with a simula-
tion of the resulting behavior of the system. They hypothesized that 
cognitive conflict might be generated when the simulated behavior is 
clearly incompatible with a student’s expectation (i.e., based on their 
real-world experience). They analyzed students’ verbal responses as 
students learned with the simulation and classified these responses 
into several types according to the extent of the conflict generated: 
despair, rejection, skepticism, and curiosity. Chinn and Brewer (1998) 
also reported several ways in which students respond to anomalous 
data: (a) ignoring the data; (b) rejecting the data; (c) professing un-
certainty about the validity of the data; (d) excluding the data; (e) 
holding the data in abeyance; (f) reinterpreting the data; (g) accept-
ing the data and making peripheral theory change; and (h), accept-
ing the data and changing their theory. In their studies, Chinn and 
Brewer proposed more specific criteria for the exploration of students’ 
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responses to discrepant events: Believability of a discrepant event, in-
consistency between a discrepant event and students’ existing concep-
tions, and belief change after experiencing a discrepant event. These 
criteria have the merit of dealing with conflict directly from a cogni-
tive perspective. 
In this study, first, we classified students’ responses to a discrep-
ant event into the following seven types: 
1. Rejection: Denying the validity of the discrepant event, 
2. Reinterpretation: Interpreting the discrepant event differently 
within the frameworks of their existing conceptions, 
3. Exclusion: Considering the discrepant event as irrelevant to 
their existing conceptions, 
4. Uncertainty: Being confident in neither the discrepant event 
nor their existing conceptions, 
5. Peripheral belief change: Accepting the discrepant event by 
making minor changes to their existing conceptions, 
6. Belief decrease: Feeling dissatisfaction with their existing con-
ceptions but not being confident of their decisions, 
7. Belief change: Feeling dissatisfaction with their existing con-
ceptions and completely giving them up. 
The classifications were based on the students’ written responses 
in the TRDE, which possesses three questions that are consistent with 
the three requisite criteria proposed by Chinn and Brewer (1998). 
Two raters independently classified a subset of randomly selected re-
sponses. Discrepancies between the raters were then discussed and 
resolved. This discussion/resolution procedure was repeated until 
the intercoder agreement reached 90%. Then, one rater classified all 
the responses again while the other rater independently checked the 
classification. 
According to Posner et al. (1982), cognitive conflict is generated 
when students feel dissatisfaction with their existing conceptions. 
Thus, for the purposes of this study, we operationalized cognitive con-
flict as the degree of dissatisfaction a student exhibits with his/her 
existing conception after being presented with a discrepant event. 
Limón and Carretero (1997) also suggested that there are different 
types of responses to a discrepant event that could be ordered in a 
continuum from the least acceptance of the discrepant event to the 
most acceptance of it. Of the seven types, rejection, reinterpretation, 
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and exclusion are reported to produce no change in students’ beliefs in 
their existing conceptions (Chinn & Brewer, 1993; Gorsky & Finegold, 
1994) so that these responses were rated as a “0.” Uncertainty is a re-
sponse type that indicates no confidence in the validity of a discrep-
ant event as well as an existing conception; such responses were rated 
as a “1.” Responses classified into peripheral belief change and belief 
decrease indicate dissatisfaction with an existing conception, at least 
to some extent, and were rated as a “2.” Belief change, a function of 
entire dissatisfaction with an existing conception, was rated as a “3.” 
Results 
Students’ Responses to the Discrepant Event 
Seven types of responses were found in the analyses of students’ 
responses to the discrepant event: rejection, reinterpretation, exclu-
sion, uncertainty, peripheral belief change, belief decrease, and be-
lief change (Table 1). 
Thirty-two students (18.7%) rejected the discrepant event. They 
did not believe the discrepant event although they were aware of the 
inconsistency between the discrepant event and their existing con-
ceptions. With rejection, there was no belief change. Rejection was 
the most common response type among students who decided not to 
change their existing conceptions in our study. Over 70 percent of 
Table 1. Frequencies (and Percentage) of Responses to the Discrepant Event. 
Type of responses  This study  Chinn & Brewer (1998) 
Ignoring  –  15 (8.2) 
Rejection  32 (18.7)  61 (33.5) 
Reinterpretation  7 (4.1) 43 (23.6) 
Exclusion  11 (6.4)  4 (2.2) 
Abeyance  –  17 (9.3) 
Uncertainty  13 (7.6)  31 (17.0) 
Peripheral belief change  17 (9.9)  3 (1.6) 
Belief decrease  24 (14.0)  – 
Belief change  67 (39.2)  8 (4.4) 
Total  171 (100∗)  182 (100∗) 
∗ Differences from 100% due to recording errors.  
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these students (23 out of 32) seemed not to be able to accept the re-
sult of the discrepant event probably because their initial beliefs were 
just too strong: “How could the lighter object float? It’s impossible.” 
or “The heavy object should sink, and the light object should float. 
It’s so natural.” Whereas six students raised more specific questions 
regarding the validity of the experiment: “Why did the student use 
two kinds of balls (i.e., plastic and iron) in his experiment? He should 
have used only one kind of ball.” (parenthesis added by present au-
thors) or “If the plastic ball weighed 1 kg, it’s too bulky to be dropped 
into the water tank.” 
Seven students (4.1%) distorted the discrepant event and regarded 
it as consistent with their beliefs. As a result, no change was made in 
their existing conceptions. Most of these students (5 out of 7) had a 
concept of heaviness that held two different meanings. For example, 
one of these students explained her reason as “I believe the result of 
the experiment because plastic is a light material by nature. So, the 
plastic ball could float though it is heavier than the iron ball which 
sank.” It is apparent that these students used the term heavy or light 
for two entirely different meanings; one as the weight and the other 
as the property of the material. It should be also noted here that a few 
students, who rejected the discrepant event, also tended to be con-
fused in using appropriate terms, but this tendency had little influence 
on their responses to the discrepant event. For the students who rein-
terpreted the discrepant event, however, the dual meaning of heavi-
ness had a marked impact on their reactions to the discrepant event. 
Eleven students (6.4%) excluded the discrepant event. They be-
lieved the result of the discrepant event and agreed that it was not 
consistent with their existing conceptions. However, there was no be-
lief change because the discrepant event was taken as having no direct 
connection with their existing conceptions or merely a kind of excep-
tion. Most of them (10 out of 11) were found to have a dual meaning 
for the heaviness concept like those classified as being the “reinter-
pretation” type. It was so natural to them that the plastic ball, which 
weighs more than the iron ball, floated because plastic is a light mate-
rial by nature. Therefore, there is no reason for them to change their 
existing conceptions. 
Thirteen students (7.6%) responded that they could not decide 
whether they should give up their existing conceptions or not. Unlike 
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other response types, responses to the three criteria were highly di-
verse among students classified to this category; someone agreed to 
the believability and/or the inconsistency, but others did not. The only 
thing that individuals in this category had in common, is that their de-
cisions were not settled yet. One student said, “After reading the re-
sult of the experiment, I don’t know which one is right.” 
Seventeen students (9.9%) accepted the discrepant event by mak-
ing some modifications to their existing conceptions. Eleven of them 
were also found to possess a dual meaning for the heaviness concept. 
Unlike those students categorized as a “reinterpretation” or an “exclu-
sion” type, however, they revamp their existing conceptions to some 
extent: “Heavy objects generally sink. But it’s not always right. If the 
material is very light, even heavy objects could float.” Five of them 
tended to revise their existing conceptions more systematically: “I 
found out my mistake. The kinds of material also affect the sinking or 
floating of objects. So, you must consider both the weight and the kind 
of material in predicting whether a certain object would sink or float.” 
Twenty-four students (14.0%) believed the discrepant event and 
found out that the discrepant event was not consistent with their ex-
isting conceptions. As a result, they agreed that their existing con-
ceptions had some problems. However, they hesitated to completely 
abandon them. Representative reasons for the decrease of conviction 
toward their existing conceptions, were the superiority of the exper-
imental result (“I think the experimental result is more reliable than 
a simple opinion.”) and the limitation of their existing conceptions in 
terms of explanatory power (“If the material is light like plastic, my 
initial thought is not right any longer.”). 
Belief change was the most frequent response type in this study. 
Sixty-seven students (39.2%) showed clear signs of abandoning their 
existing conceptions. The major reason given by these students (28 
out of 67) was the superiority of the experimental result over an opin-
ion: “I gave up my initial thought because the experiment showed me 
clear evidence.” Although no alternative concept was presented by 
the TRDE, 25 students indicated their own alternative explanations: 
“Whether a certain kind of object would sink or float is dependent 
on the material of that object.” In some cases (3 students), the target 
misconception was replaced by another misconception: “It’s not the 
weight but the volume that decides whether an object would sink or 
float.” 
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Relationship between Cognitive Conflict and Conceptual Change 
Means and standard deviations of the tests administered are pre-
sented in Table 2. Pearson correlation coefficients among students’ 
test scores are presented in Table 3. The correlation coefficient, be-
tween the TRDE scores and the conception test scores, was statisti-
cally significant (p < .01). The scores of the GALT and the FASP showed 
statistically significant correlations with the score of the TRDE (p < 
.05 and p < .01, respectively). The scores of the GALT, the FASP, and 
the MLAQ were also significantly correlated statistically with the con-
ception test scores. 
Types of Responses and the Degree of Cognitive Conflict by 
Cognitive Variables 
In order to investigate the effects of students’ cognitive character-
istics on the degree of cognitive conflict, we selected students from 
the top 25% (high level) and from the bottom 25% (low level) based 
on the scores of the GALT, the FASP, and the MLAQ respectively. Then, 
we compared the distributions of response types (Table 4) and the 
scores of the TRDE (Table 5) between the two groups. 
Table 3. Correlation Coefficients among Variables. 
Variable  GALT  FASP  MLAQ  TRDE 
Logical thinking ability (GALT)  – 
Field dependence/independence (FASP)  .258**  – 
Meaningful Learning approach (MLAQ)  .224**  .213**  – 
Cognitive conflict (TRDE)  .154*  .240**  .033  –
Conceptual change (Conception test)  .511**  .292**  .195*  .232** 
* p < .05
** p < .01  
Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations of the Tests. 
 GALT  FASP  MLAQ  TRDE  Conception test 
  (n = 170)  (n = 165)  (n = 167)  (n = 171)  (n = 171) 
Mean  4.08  10.03  29.54  1.73  4.01
SD  2.44  5.06  5.88  1.25  2.56 
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For students with high logical thinking ability there were more 
belief change responses whereas there were more rejection and re-
interpretation responses for those with low logical thinking ability. 
A t-test result showed that the difference between the TRDE scores 
of these two groups was statistically significant (p < .05). These re-
sults indicated that students with high logical thinking ability tended 
to accept the discrepant event and feel dissatisfaction with their ex-
isting conceptions whereas those with low logical thinking ability 
tended to respond in unexpected ways and to maintain their own 
existing conceptions. In the analyses of the effects of field depen-
dence/independence on cognitive conflict, more obvious differences 
between the high and the low groups were found. Field indepen-
dent students made more responses of belief change whereas field 
dependent students made more responses of rejection and reinter-
pretation. The differences between the TRDE scores of these two 
groups were also found to be statistically significant (p < .01). That 
is, more cognitive conflict was aroused for the field independent 
students than for the field dependent students after experiencing 
Table 5. T -test Results on the Degree of Cognitive Conflict by the Levels of Cognitive 
Variables. 
Variable                              Mean (SD)   t  df  p 
 Low  High
GALT  1.55 (1.34)  2.24 (1.06)  2.150  53  .036 
FASP  1.00 (1.21)  1.85 (1.23)  2.980  72  .004 
MLAQ  1.59 (1.32)  1.88 (1.28)  .944 75  .348
Table 4. Frequencies (and Percentage) of Students’ Responses to the Discrepant Event by 
Levels of the Cognitive Variables. 
Type of responses  GALT   FASP   MLAQ
 Low  High  Low  High  Low  High 
Rejection  5 (22.7)  4 (12.1)  11 (31.4)  8 (20.5)  10 (27.0)  7 (17.5 
Reinterpretation  2 (9.1)  –  3 (8.6)  –  –  2 (5.0) 
Exclusion  1 (4.5)  1 (3.0)  5 (14.3)  1 (2.6)  3 (8.1)  2 (5.0) 
Uncertainty  2 (9.1)  –  3 (8.6)  5 (12.8)  3 (8.1)  2 (5.0) 
Perip. belief change  –  8 (24.2)  3 (8.6)  5 (12.8)  4 (10.8)  5 (12.5) 
Belief decrease  4 (18.2)  2 (6.1)  4 (11.4)  3 (7.7)  3 (8.1)  3 (7.5) 
Belief change  8 (36.4)  18 (54.5)  6 (17.1)  17 (43.6)  14 (37.8)  19 (47.5) 
Total  22  33  35  39  37  40  
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the discrepant event. In the case of learning approach, more belief 
change responses were found for students with a meaningful learn-
ing strategy whereas more rejection responses were found for their 
counterparts. The TRDE scores of the two groups, however, were not 
significantly different. Unlike logical thinking ability or field depen-
dence/independence, meaningful learning approach was found to 
have little effect on inducing cognitive conflict. 
Discussion 
Quantifying Cognitive Conflict 
At first, we predicted that the students’ responses to the discrepant 
event would fall into the eight response types as Chinn and Brewer 
(1998) proposed. However, two of them, ignoring and abeyance did 
not fit for our study although they had been both finely defined and 
had been encountered as responses in the test of the taxonomy. These 
inconsistencies might result from characteristics specific to the topic 
of density and/or the discrepant event used in our study. 
First, ignoring and rejection merged into one response type. The 
only difference between ignoring and rejection, according to Chinn 
and Brewer (1998), is whether students try to explain why they cannot 
believe the discrepant event. This criterion made sense in their work 
because the anomalous data (i.e., discrepant events) were the results 
of rather complicated scientific experiments and there was room for 
students to point out certain kinds of problems regarding the experi-
ments (e.g., insufficient data, inaccurate measurement, faulty meth-
odology, etc.). In our study, however, the discrepant event was not 
only a simple experiment but also an example of clear and direct evi-
dence against the initial explanation. This resulted in a situation that 
made it more difficult for students to specify their reasons for reject-
ing the discrepant event. In addition, consideration for the limitations 
imposed by the use of a paper-and-pencil test also led us to combine 
the two response types. Mason (2001) also pointed out this problem in 
studying eighth graders’ responses to anomalous data concerning the 
meteor impact theory and/or the classic theory about the Giza pyra-
mids. He suggested that the students who did not agree with the va-
lidity of the anomalous data without expressing any reason and did 
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not discount their beliefs in the existing conceptions, might have ig-
nored the data in the same way as had the students classified as the 
rejection type. 
Uncertainty and abeyance also merged into one response type. 
Once again, the latter is different from the former in that students do 
not provide evident explanations for delaying their final decisions. In 
Chinn and Brewer’s (1998) work, a wide range of explanations could 
be made because the initial theories allowed respondents to bring 
substantial background knowledge to bear. Moreover, the initial the-
ories themselves are only “frontier theories” (Duschl, 1990) for which 
debates exist even among scientists. Therefore, students could hold 
out the possibility that the initial theory might be able to explain the 
anomalous data in the future. In our study, however, it is difficult to 
expect such responses because the “sink or float” problem is not so 
complex or obscure as to require later evidence and/or explanations. 
Unlike ignoring and abeyance, belief decrease is a new response 
type in our study. Strictly speaking, however, belief decrease is not 
a distinctive response type as compared with the ones Chinn and 
Brewer (1998) proposed, because its characteristics are similar to be-
lief change except for the extent of students’ conviction toward aban-
doning their existing conceptions. As stated earlier, however, belief 
decrease responses indicated that students admitted the problems as-
sociated with their existing conceptions but they did not completely 
give up such conceptions. It is problematic to regard both response 
types as identical from the viewpoint of quantifying the degree of cog-
nitive conflict. Thus, we separated belief decrease from belief change 
and treated it as an independent response type exclusively with in-
tent to quantify cognitive conflict. 
It was found that students had a particular conception regarding 
weight (or heaviness) from their responses to the discrepant event. 
The term “weight” was used with two different meanings; it was a 
kind of homonym. One was the concept of weight of a certain object 
possessing almost the same meaning as that used by scientists. The 
other was the concept of “natural heaviness” of the certain material; 
they regarded matter like iron or stone as heavy materials and mat-
ter like wood or plastic as light materials by nature. This latter con-
cept is very similar, not perfect from the scientific point of view, to 
that of “density” although the students had not yet formally learned 
the concept of density. This early-stage concept of density, however, 
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has two facets. Sometimes it helped students to realize that a prob-
lem existed with their current conceptions, which led them to aban-
don their previous beliefs. Twenty-five students changed their exist-
ing beliefs on the basis of this early-stage density concept, although 
there was still a little confusion about using the term “weight.” Some-
times, on the contrary, it could be an obstacle to learning the scien-
tific concept of density. Another 26 students responded to the discrep-
ant event with reinterpretation, exclusion, or peripheral belief change 
on the basis of the same early-stage density concept. It is noteworthy 
that an early-stage concept of density functioned, at least for some 
students, as an important tool to maintain their existing undifferen-
tiated weight-density conception. 
It is very important to clarify the types of responses given by stu-
dents with respect to discrepant events; such an action can help teach-
ers expect and prepare for students’ possible reactions to concep-
tual change instruction. From this point of view, the taxonomy Chinn 
and Brewer (1998) proposed is very useful. Although the settings of 
their study were rather different from those of practical classrooms 
(e.g., several different theories and several pieces of anomalous data), 
their taxonomy accurately anticipated most middle school students’ 
response types. 
The distribution of students’ responses in this study was very dif-
ferent, however, from that reported by Chinn and Brewer (1998) (Ta-
ble 1). Compared to those reported by Chinn and Brewer, the per-
centages of rejection (including ignoring), reinterpretation, and 
uncertainty (including abeyance) were relatively smaller, whereas 
the percentage of belief change was much higher in our study. A pos-
sible reason for such disparate differences might be associated with 
the characteristics of the respective topics used. Unlike our study, 
Chinn and Brewer selected frontier theories, possessing rival alter-
natives, as the initial theories and presented students with evidence 
from rather complicated and expert scientific experiments as discrep-
ant events. There might be more room for students to raise questions 
regarding the validity of the discrepant events in those contexts be-
cause the topics chosen had inherent unsolved problems. Therefore, a 
greater frequency of responses such as rejection, reinterpretation, and 
uncertainty should not be unusual in their study. In addition, as Ma-
son (2001) pointed out, the discrepant events that Chinn and Brewer 
used possessed a peculiar characteristic in which students had to rely 
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only on the argumentative plausibility and the justifiability as they 
appeared in the given texts. In contrast, the discrepant event used in 
our study – a “sink or float” experiment – must be one of the most fre-
quently experienced phenomena in students’ everyday life. Thus, stu-
dents could have pictured the discrepant event and/or related expe-
rience in their mind and could have judged the value of their existing 
conceptions with relative ease, which lead more students to abandon 
their existing conceptions.  
Cognitive Conflict and Conceptual Change 
The role of conflict in cognitive development and/or learning is a 
topic of ongoing debate (e.g., Cantor, 1983; Murray, 1983; Zimmerman 
& Blom, 1983; see Limón, 2001, for a review in science education). 
Most Piagetian advocates (i.e., personal or radical constructivists; Gee-
lan, 1997) hypothesize that cognitive conflict is a precondition for in-
tellectual development. Other researchers, such as social learning the-
orists, have not considered cognitive conflict as crucial to learning 
(Bandura, 1977). Social learning theorists regard learning as a form of 
rule acquisition and emphasize other parameters of social experience 
like the clarity and consistency of modeled information (Zimmerman, 
1977). Some science educators who emphasize the importance of so-
cial, environmental, and/or contextual aspects of conceptual change 
(e.g., social constructivists) also criticize the use of cognitive conflict 
as an instructional strategy. Their reason is that students tend to su-
perficially patch up local inconsistencies without reaching the neces-
sary conceptual change in situations of cognitive conflict (Vosniadou, 
1999). The results of this study implied that both positions may have 
some validity. First, statistically significant correlations were found 
between the degrees of cognitive conflict and conceptual change. This 
result can be inferred to mean that cognitive conflict might be an im-
portant factor and should be considered in the process of concept 
learning. On the other hand, the correlation coefficient was rather low 
which means that cognitive conflict might not be as crucial in con-
cept learning as Piagetian advocates expect. Thus, perhaps there is a 
strong possibility that cognitive conflict is only one of the important 
factors to be considered in concept learning rather than a necessary 
prerequisite for it. 
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Logical thinking ability was found to be significantly correlated 
statistically with cognitive conflict. Students with high logical think-
ing ability aroused more cognitive conflict after experiencing the dis-
crepant event than those with low ability. A possible interpretation 
of this result is that students with low logical thinking ability do not 
possess the capability necessary to appropriately evaluate the dis-
crepant event. It is necessary for students to evaluate the validity 
of a discrepant event and the degree of inconsistency between such 
a discrepant event and their existing conceptions to initiate cogni-
tive conflict (Limón, 2001). The students with low ability might fail 
to reach the expected threshold necessary to provoke conflict for the 
lack of reasoning skill. This interpretation is consistent with previ-
ous research. It was reported that students with higher logical think-
ing ability tended to reduce conflict on their own whereas those with 
lower ability sought information from other sources (Gorsky & Fine-
gold, 1994). Lawson and Thompson (1988) also reported that when a 
new theory that is not consistent with their existing one is presented, 
concrete-operational students tended to fail to reject the naive the-
ory because they might lack the reasoning skill to internally evaluate 
the relative merits and demerits of their naive theory and the com-
peting theory. 
Field dependence/independence was also found to be significantly 
correlated with cognitive conflict. With respect to the discrepant event 
provided, more cognitive conflict was generated among field inde-
pendent students than for field dependent ones. Witkin et al. (1977) 
indicated that field independence is the ability to disembed relevant 
information from an irrelevant background. Field independent stu-
dents also tend to use better organizing and structuring strategies 
(Davis, 1991) and to be good at analytical problem solving (Gordon, 
1998). The interpretation of this result agrees well with the previous 
research. Field independent students might be more capable of de-
tecting the inconsistency between the discrepant event and their ex-
isting conceptions, and might approach the information presented in 
the discrepant event more analytically than field dependent students. 
Therefore, there is a greater possibility of engaging cognitive conflict 
among field independent students. 
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Implications for Teachers 
When teachers plan to teach the concept of density, they should 
pay close attention to students’ preinstructional conceptions to elim-
inate potential obstacles to conceptual change. As stated in the dis-
cussion above, at least half of the seventh graders in this study (in-
cluding those who were excluded from participating as subjects) were 
found to have an early-stage density concept even before they formally 
learned it in school. The problem, ironically, is that this early-stage 
density concept might lead some students to respond to discrepant 
events with rejection or reinterpretation while still others respond 
with belief change. Therefore, when introducing the concept of den-
sity, teachers should emphasize the differentiation between weight 
and density because the problem many students have is not that they 
do not understand the concept of density but that they cannot distin-
guish one concept from the other. In addition, the results concerning 
the influences of students’ cognitive characteristics on cognitive con-
flict implied that intimate knowledge of students’ cognitive charac-
teristics is indispensable to teachers who are trying to overcome per-
sistent misconceptions among their students. 
Further Research 
We defined and quantified, in this study, the degree of cognitive 
conflict induced by a discrepant event exclusively from a cognitive 
viewpoint. Like all operational definitions of theoretical concepts, 
however, the alternative definition for cognitive conflict developed 
here cannot respond perfectly to each and every situation because of 
the complexity of human learning. Discrepant events, as previously 
shown, play an important role in inducing cognitive conflict as well 
as initiating students’ motivation to learn through the use of a learn-
ing cycle (Lawson, Abraham, & Renner, 1989) or generative learn-
ing model (Osborne & Freyberg, 1985). It was reported that students 
showed more curiosity and interest when the given phenomenon or 
information is not consistent with their expectations (e.g., Frick, 1992; 
Yarlas & Gelman, 1998). 
The interest stimulated by an inconsistent experience (i.e., discrep-
ant events) could lead students to pay more attention to the learning 
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material. In addition, evidence from previous research suggested that 
interest not only motivates students to learn but also influences com-
prehension and learning (see Schraw & Lehman, 2001, for a review). 
Pintrich (1999) and Pintrich, Marx, and Boyle (1993) suggested that 
motivational constructs, such as mastery goal orientation, adoption 
of a constructivist belief about learning, higher levels of personal in-
terest, self-efficacy, and personal control, should be potential media-
tors of the process of conceptual change. Hidi (1990) also suggested 
that the concept of interest should be recognized as an integral part 
of cognition and incorporated into expanded theories on the subject. 
Considering these suggestions, further research including the exam-
ination of the motivational role of conflict is needed to get a compre-
hensive understanding regarding the role of cognitive conflict in con-
ceptual change. 
The processes which comprise the phenomenon of learning, espe-
cially in practical classrooms, are very complicated because many in-
teractions among students, teacher, and environments simultaneously 
occur. In this study, we purposely ruled out student(s)-student(s), 
teacher-student(s), and student(s)-environment interactions in or-
der to isolate conditions as far as possible for all participants. Our de-
cision for excluding the interactions might underestimate the inter-
dependent relationships among those variables investigated in this 
study and the need for these interactions. The intervention of this 
study may be too short (i.e., the administration of both the TRDE and 
the CAI corresponds to about one class period of normal instruction). 
However, the content could be covered in one class period under the 
National Science Curriculum of Korea, and the result of a conceptual 
change instruction in our previous study indicated that the interven-
tion of one class period was reasonably successful at least in learning 
the basic density concept (Noh et al., 1997). Further investigation may 
be needed to reveal the influence of intervention time on the relation-
ship between cognitive conflict and conceptual change. 
Considering that initial belief changes are not very stable, a further 
piece of research to test the longevity of the changed beliefs (e.g., ad-
ministering a retention conception test) might reveal other aspects of 
the relationship between cognitive conflict and conceptual change. In 
order to understand the relationship between students’ logical think-
ing ability and cognitive conflict, further research is also needed. Stu-
dents who are above a certain threshold level in logical thinking ability 
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may benefit from cognitive conflict, while those below the threshold 
level may not identify the conflict. Finally, considering the result that 
students’ reasoning skill and cognitive style influenced the degree of 
cognitive conflict they experienced, further research is also needed to 
find out the most appropriate content and/or type of discrepant events 
to use; content/type of discrepant event(s) that is consistent with stu-
dents’ cognitive characteristics. 
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